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1 Executive Summary 
Two-thirds of the world’s Internet population now visit an online community or blogging site and the 
sector now accounts for almost 10% of all Internet time. A quarter of a million users sign up to social 
networking sites every day worldwide and a third of those who have a profile on a social network 
update it daily. Participation and privacy are critical success factors that underpin healthy and 
vibrant online communities. It is essential that Future Internet researchers understand the 
complexities of participation and privacy in the design of systems to ensure that technologies are 
socially, ethically and legally acceptable.  
This report explores perspectives on participation and privacy within online communities by applying 
different analytical techniques to a case study from e-Government.  
• Collaborative network organisations (CNO): Design from the users’ perspective 
• Tussles: Design the playing field and not the outcome 
• Risk management: Design for outcome considering uncertainty 
In addition to discussing participation and privacy issues, each technique was assessed against the 
ability to 1) construct issues and research challenges, 2) facilitate communication and debate, 3) 
assessment of technology advances, 4) improve engineering design through insights from other 
domains, 5) design legally compliant Future Internet systems and 6) improve project design and 
decision making. The overarching conclusion was that examining the issues from different 
perspectives highlights different concerns that need to be considered within system requirements 
and architectural design. CNO highlighted the need for mechanisms to facilitate federation between 
different collaboration structures, tussles highlighted issues such as the economic conflicts in 
outsourcing processing of personal data to clouds and risk management identified the security 
mechanisms necessary for data protection compliance. 
From a participation and privacy perspective the results showed that the goal to increase 
participation in political discourse through the use of popular social networking sites has many 
attractions. Likewise, the goal to comply with data protection legislation is also equally valid and as 
well as necessary. The CNO analysis shows that a critical success factor (i.e. participation) for social 
networking providers is to maximise activity, which is achieved irrespective of the purpose of the 
communication between individuals. The risk assessment highlights that for legal compliance 
providers must take responsibilities (in respect to purpose) and individuals need to take certain 
actions (e.g. consent). So here lies the contradiction. Privacy compliance, often declared as a way to 
increase trust, and hence participation, often impedes activity and actually acts as an inhibiter to 
participation in many situations. In reality, individuals use social networking sites because their 
perception of risk is considered low enough for participation. It is the perception of and appetite for 
risk that that dictate levels of participation, irrespective of associated regulation. Data protection can 
help but usually where low-levels of trust exist. 
This leads to an interesting challenge for European service providers and research projects. How to 
balance strike the balance between participation and privacy considering desires to monitor and 
mine data without violating a citizen’s right to privacy? Architectures that facilitate communication 
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between individuals regardless of purpose have been important innovators in the Internet. It is a 
principle that has contributed to the explosion of Internet use (the end-point principle) and it is 
improbable that the successful paradigms of the last decade, social networking and clouds, would 
not have prospered if they had considered compliance to the European regulatory environment. 
Each new paradigm has focused on promoting the benefits of solutions and opted for weak privacy 
positions. The try it and observe approach has allowed for a privacy balance to evolve over time as 
participants explored their preferences rather than having them analysed in advance by security 
experts. Social networking has been in fact a large experiment in people’s appetite for privacy but 
how Europe strikes the balance between participation and privacy remains a matter of serious 
debate. 
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2 Introduction 
Since its inception, the Internet has rapidly and without particular regulation or control become 
pervasive. What began as a fairly esoteric communication mechanism between academics has now 
become the de facto standard to complement or even replace traditional activities from banking and 
shopping to social interaction and information retrieval. The social aspects that affect the Internet 
and its evolution are as complex and interwoven as society itself. The interdependence of the 
analytical disciplines creates complexity, disciplines that study changes in human nature, where 
economics, political science, humanities, psychology and law are linked to concepts like privacy, 
freedom of expression, intellectual property and social networks but also to topics like education, 
security, regulation, private life, communication, business, trust, intangible incentives, to name but a 
few. What is clear is that creating teams that can be innovative through the development of novel 
Future Internet technologies is a complex endeavour. 
The “real world” users of the Internet (i.e. consumers, citizens, students, politicians, scholars, artists, 
parents, etc.) constitute a powerful but also dynamic organism. Understanding the dynamics of 
individual and community behaviour, regulatory environments and markets and how such forces 
influence technical choices is increasingly important at all phases in the innovation lifecycle
1
. From 
early stage prototypes within university testbeds through to advanced pilots deployed within online 
communities or living labs, the needs and the rights of the stakeholders matter, and as the maturity 
of technology evolves they matter more. The challenge is to facilitate communication between 
different stakeholders and domains of expertise so that values can be debated, major issues can be 
constructed and the wealth of insights from the social science studies can be brought to bear on 
engineering decisions. Of course, as with most aspects of life, things are not that simple and such a 
dialogue must be approached from a broad and holistic perspective that acknowledges that each 
domain brings different viewpoints, languages and concerns. This is where ICT SESERV 
(http://www.seserv.org) comes into play by providing a multidisciplinary team that aims to bridge 
the gap between socio-economic experts and technologists. SESERV takes no specific position on 
technology, society or the economy but aims to act as a channel between disciplines. SESERV will 
engage with representative Future Internet projects to study socio-economic tensions and how they 
are addressed by project teams. 
In this paper, we give a flavour of a multidisciplinary dialogue by examining one  ICT project, WeGov. 
The project aims to make use of online communities as a way to increase the engagement of 
individuals and communities in government policy dialogue and debate. ICT research and 
development is at the heart of the project but evaluation of results through experiments and the 
freedom to use the results beyond the lifetime of the project are essential elements. The project 
must achieve data protection compliance for Future Internet research experiments that aim to 
collect and process personal data from online communities for the identification and tracking of 
political opinion whilst considering incentive models for individual participation in experiments: a 
challenge for a “Specific Targeted Research Project”, which by its nature has a significant degree of 
risk and low maturity of technology
2
. The approach presented below focuses on the use and 
                                                          
1
 As the technology and the tools it creates become ever more powerful, so it is crucial for users to be made aware of the restrictions 
imposed on them and the incentives not to abuse them. 
2
 To a significant extent, the WeGov project could be said to hold much responsibility. Beyond its own experiments, it must demonstrate 
that these data can be used fairly and legally. With this in mind, one of the deliverables is a code of conduct for those using the tools. 
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comparison of analytical methods from different domains as a way to provide socio-economic 
perspectives on the issues concerned: data privacy legislation and participation models. 
3 The ICT WeGov Case Study 
Governments have seen the value of the Internet to encourage public participation in policy 
planning and policy making. The challenge is how to motivate them. Engaging citizens in 
Government, especially policy making and review, is not easy: there may be a lack of trust or simply 
no motivation to become involved, unless of course there is some feedback mechanism from those 
interested in the views expressed. Perhaps those who do tend to have rather polarised and non-
representative views. One issue is the expectation of how participation might be reflected in the 
policies that are made: if the public perceive that their discussion is not taken into account in favour 
of the views or recommendations of experts employed directly by the Government
3
, then involving 
the general public in government is bound to fail. One possibility is to try to capitalise on existing 
participatory fora: social networks. It is already known that online communities continue to flourish, 
irrespective of issues around privacy and data access. More importantly, participation within an 
appropriate institutional or organisational context can and does promote participation [14]. 
 
Figure 1: WeGoV stakeholders 
The WeGov project seeks to capitalise on the popularity of existing social-networking sites to 
facilitate open dialogue between citizen and Government [12]. The project aims to make available 
                                                          
3
 [14] examines the relationship between expert and novice in policy-making, and the dynamic introduced by online community 
participation. 
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the opinions and responses to seeded discussion topics, based on policy plans and decisions, within 
social networks such as facebook®. The data are collated and aggregated by appropriate government 
agencies to be made available to policy makers to inform and support their efforts. To move the 
debate forward as well as to demonstrate to users that their opinions are indeed important, policy 
makers need to provide feedback from their side back to the online community. 
Projects such as WeGov can quickly run into problems, especially were data protection is concerned. 
The constraints imposed by such regulation introduce competing and sometimes opposing demands 
encroaching onto the project as it proceeds. Trade-offs must be made between the level of research 
versus legal compliance versus operational evaluation. Basically, the closer a projects evaluation is to 
operational reality (i.e. using data from real people in a social network) the more representative and 
exploitable are the results, but at the cost of need to address increased demands for legal 
compliance. It is helpful to be able to identify and resolve such conflicts as early within the design 
lifecycle as possible but at a minimum an understanding of how stakeholders’ concerns present 
potential barriers to adoption is essential throughout the innovation lifecycle. The basic project 
scenario outlined in the funding proposal is shown in Figure 1. The immediate stakeholders in the 
project (highlighted in yellow) include the research consortium, the Commission and the end-users. 
The consortium is funded by the Commission in return for research output; and that output is 
delivered as a service or toolset to the end users. The end users in this case are not individual 
citizens; instead, they are government representatives charged with analysing and aggregating  
incoming data as well as providing suitable feedback to maintain and encourage debate. There are, 
however, other stakeholders. The citizens are involved at different levels and yet are not directly 
represented within the project. The Government (the “legislature”) has significant influence over the 
project, setting the boundaries and constraints on what constitutes private and sensitive data, as 
well as how those data can be processed. In addition, the consortium’s original proposal included 
services to be supplied by Cloud providers for large-scale message processing. So these providers are 
also of relevance to the project and the consortium assumes that they will be able to offer services 
that can support the type of processing required.  
4 A Matter of Perspective 
When approaching an analysis of a project, its objectives and concerns there are many possible 
starting positions, viewpoints and a range of methods that could be adopted. Methods typically 
originate from a variety of disciplines, and the perspectives they bring have the potential to deliver 
different insights that can help in understanding how to design Future Internet systems. Our 
approach in SESERV is to identify a representative set of methods that allows the assessment of 
social, economic and regulatory dimensions as described in Section 1. We identified that WeGov has 
largely social and regulatory interactions but we also include an economic assessment to understand 
if a method based on resource contention can have added value. 
The questions and issues that the project faces are summarised in Figure 2. The boundaries between 
regulatory, social and economic concerns are not easy to identify with complete certainty. Providing 
incentives, for instance, may be economic if associated with financial or some other gain, but it is 
social in terms of social networking sites (SNS’s) where individuals are more likely to be incentivised 
by belonging to a community. But nevertheless, the social, regulatory and economic aspects of the 
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project are associated with different questions: how do people engage? what has to be done to 
remain within legislative boundaries, and what is the cost in terms of architecture and so forth. The 
methods we use to evaluate the project and seek to find solutions to problems identified, therefore, 
need to consider these different perspectives. 
 
Figure 2: Methods and perspectives 
Initially, we use a SWOT analysis as a way to quickly highlight the major project concerns. We then 
analyse the social issues by considering the properties of collaborative network organisations. 
Economic issues are examined using Tussle Analysis that has been proposed specifically from the 
Internet community as a mechanism to help analyse contentions. Finally, we use risk and scenario 
analysis as a way of identifying risk factors that can affect projects, as well as considering mitigation 
associated with those factors. In each case, the method is applied to the WeGov project and any of 
the potential issues summarised. Specifically we focus on the objective of data protection 
compliance and participation for Future Internet research experiments that aim to collect and 
process personal data from online communities for identification and tracking of political opinion.  
Each method highlights specific advantages which suggest a different approach to their resolution.   
4.1 SWOT: Getting to grips with the issues 
To summarise the project, consider it in terms of a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and 
Threats) analysis. Although traditionally used in connection with business proposals, and lacking 
some of the rigour of other, more process-driven methodologies, it provides a useful, and easily 
generated starting point and overview of the characteristics of the WeGov project.  
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This brief survey highlights that the main issues, irrespective of the quadrant, relate to incentives for 
participation and trust. 
• Participation: Do citizens believe that they will be listened to? Is participation more likely 
within a known social networking context than in a bespoke environment? Can participation 
be encouraged from representative citizens? 
• Trust: Will the data (personal opinion) be adequately protected? Will 3
rd
 parties do their best 
to support a project that they are not directly involved in? Is participation worth it? (Will 
citizens be heard? 
Strengths Weaknesses 
The project aims to engage with citizens in 
an environment they already use and 
understand (social networking sites). As 
such, users are more likely to continue to 
be comfortable and to contribute to the 
discussion, rather than to need time or 
remain suspicious of a new environment. 
The discussion fora therefore become an 
extension of what they know rather than 
an intrusion. 
Dependency on external suppliers: the project is reliant on resources 
provided by 3
rd
 parties not directly involved in the original proposal. 
Dependency on citizen engagement: the project needs citizens to get 
involved. There may be many different factors which discourage them from 
so doing. 
Data protection: anything to do with data protection tends to cause 
suspicion on the part of the citizens; as well as much regulation
4
. 
General mistrust of government: a manifestation of Big Brother paranoia 
and the Nanny State interfering and snooping into our everyday lives. 
Opportunities Threats 
Demonstrate to Government that public 
engagement is possible in public policy-
making without the need to develop new 
discussion fora or infrastructure.   
 
Public demonstration that participation is 
possible, non-threatening and 
unobtrusive. 
 
Public demonstration that citizen 
participation can make a difference with 
policy-makers. 
No participation of citizens: there are many reasons why citizens may not 
engage. Without them, there are no data to analyse and therefore no input 
for policy makers. 
Lack of participant agreement to use of data: even with their participation, 
citizens may refuse to allow their opinions to be used for any purpose 
associated with Government. 
Non-representative participation: those who do engage and who are happy 
with their opinions being passed on to Government may always be vocal and 
opinionated, and used to voicing their opinions publically. They may not, 
however, be a truly random sample of citizens. 
Changes in legislation: given the sensitivity surrounding data protection, 
new regulation could mean that different, more stringent measures are 
required, or the opposite: that much effort was expended to protect data 
which is not subsequently necessary. 
Table 1: SWOT analysis for ICT WeGov 
The issues which the SWOT analysis seems to highlight are neither financial (economic) contention
5
 
nor technical (infrastructure) in nature
6
. The project in general revolves around novel or extended 
use or applications rather than how such use might be supported. 
                                                          
4
 Data protection and privacy tend to provoke strong, and often, negative public reaction. This can be the result of a loss of data (well-
publicised cases of computer theft or other governmental failure to protect data) or stirring up opinion around Big Brother and the loss of 
civil liberties. 
5
 The issue around dependency on 3rd parties (for data processing) could, it might be argued, be reduced or even removed with sufficient 
economic incentive. But this is a solution to a potential issue; not the issue itself. 
6
 It could be argued that issues of participation and trust could be associated with both social as well as economic motives. For instance, 
participation for someone in full employment and a busy private life may seem worthless (what is called “opportunity cost” in economics); 
for someone who is not employed or retired, it may be quite the opposite. 
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4.2 Collaborative network organisations: Design from the users’ 
perspective 
In this section, we use a socially-based approach, or rather body of work, as a way to examine 
participation models in WeGov. In a number of related studies, Dutton and co-workers have 
explored issues related to user participation in online services [4, 5 and 6]. Starting from the bold 
assertion that: 
“All technologies are inherently social, in that they are designed, produced, used and governed 
by people”
7
 
They regard:  
“Understanding relevant social and institutional dimensions […] a key priority in addressing the 
way these technologies affect trust, crime and related issues” [6:28] 
In the context of individual participation in online communities, there are a number of fundamental 
assertions, which ostensibly emphasises the social dimensions of projects (see Figure 1 above) rather 
more than the economic or regulatory. Yet, what Dutton and colleagues present is convincing 
evidence of a different set of criteria to regulation (“legislation” in Figure 1), motivation through 
financial negotiation (“economics”) or through collaborative engagement (“society”). Dutton and 
Shepherd, for instance, suggest that cybertrust should be viewed in more generic terms in the same 
way as individuals do: an everyday “confident expectation” that what they wish to be protected will 
be. Further, there is clear support for a view that frequent, or more familiar users are likely to have 
more realistic expectations around privacy than novice users despite more negative experiences 
such as spamming that their greater usage generates [6:25 and passim]. People adapt and learn to 
set their own boundaries [op.cit.]. This is a very significant finding indeed. The implication is that 
irrespective of any regulatory prescription, whatever the technical infrastructure provides in terms 
of privacy and data protection will be used by individuals as they wish. Privacy is to do with people’s 
experience and expectations, therefore, and not what government lays down
8
. 
In exploring personal interaction with the Internet and online communities, Dutton defines a simple 
typology of individual engagement with networked facilities or communities:  
1.0 Sharing: relating to networks of individuals who simply share information and data; 
participants post content for all to see and refer to; 
2.0 Contributing: describing networks or communities where individuals or user groups assess 
aggregate and comment on content, so that all can benefit from such evaluation; and  
3.0 Co-creating (or Collaborating): in which individuals collaborate to create, disseminate and 
monitor content
10
. 
                                                          
7
 Dutton, W.H. (1999) Society on the Line: Information Politics in the Digital Age, OUP, Oxford and New York; cited in [6] 
8
 The point is this: experienced users set their own expectations as determined by their continued use of a service, often independently of 
whatever the technology provides. facebook(R)® may offer better security settings, for instance, but that alone will not necessarily affect 
the trust level of experienced users. One example that Dutton and Shepherd quote is that even spam eMails will not deter experienced 
users from continued use of online services.  
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Alongside this typology, he explores issues such as the need and role of management (of individuals 
as well as content, and the moderation of fora), the social underpinnings of participation, and the 
technical requirements associated with the platforms supporting the network. Although discussed 
and presented primarily in the context of more formalised communities (including social networking 
and collaborative work) [4], establishing what relevance this typology as well as observations around 
cybertrust and user experience have to WeGov will help identify what a social analysis might bring to 
this type of project. 
As outlined above, WeGov directly engages members of the general public in political discussion 
using existing technologies (SNS) for the purpose of aggregating content. As such, the perception of 
those users of the Internet and how they engage in online communities is of particular importance, 
but in addition, how that community of citizens is supported technically and how the opinion 
gathering exercises are managed are key factors in the design and development of the deliverables. 
It is vital that transparency is offered and maintained in this context: citizens need to be kept 
informed of what is happening to the information (the opinions in this situation) they offer. Let us 
focus primarily on aspects of participation, which was identified as a particular concern in the 
introductory SWOT analysis. 
Consider first the typology of citizen participation, summarised in Table 2 with respect to the 
underlying architecture as well as aspects of the processes associated with the interactions
9
 within 
the different types of collaborative network organisation (CNO). 
Mechanism 1.0
10
 Sharing 2.0 Contributing  3.0 Co-creating 
Architecture One-to-Many
11
 Many-to-Many Many-to-One 
Openness Open Networked Managed 
Control Low Moderate
12
 (reputation) High 
Modularization Low Moderate
12 
(simple tasks) High 
Table 2: Collaborative Network Organisations (CNO) typology (from [4]) 
The underlying architecture for each CNO type needs to support interactions from those based on 
one individual communicating with many, to those where many individuals work together to 
produce a single output (code or documents generated by a whole team using collaborative 
development tools, for instance). The architecture “mechanism” is fairly obvious and straight-
forward. Any specific technical issues arise from the interaction types. For instance, within 3.0 Co-
creation, collaborative tools need to support functional ownership and version control, whereas in 
1.0 Sharing, the only requirement is for some level of naming convention and control. 
The other “mechanisms” and terms require some explanation. Openness and Control refer to the 
degree to which individuals and the content they produce or view needs to be managed. For 
                                                          
9
 In the original discussion, interactions are between direct participants within the CNO. For WeGov this would include both the citizens 
offering their opinions and the policy makers providing feedback. 
10
 1.0 – sharing hypertext documents, data and other digital objects; 2.0 – deploying social networking tools to support collaboration and 
generate user-content; and 3.0 – applying collaborative software to support cooperative co-creation. [4:215] 
11
 The “one” and “many” here refer to participants engaged in sharing or collaborating. 
12
 The ambiguity in the use of moderate is in the original and probably not intentional. 
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instance, within a 2.0 Contributing CNO, users of a community which provides technical know-how 
or support such as the SAP Community Network (SCN) tend to be self-regulating in terms of 
contributions and especially who is an expert and who is not (Control is via moderation). Similarly, in 
a 3.0 Co-creating environment, the Openness or access to the network as well as content is managed 
so that only those with a legitimate reason to be participating can. The final line of the table, 
Modularization, refers to the extent to which work or interactions need to be split into smaller, more 
manageable chunks: in a 1.0 Sharing environment, all tasks tend to be simple and self-contained: a 
single user will format, write and check an entire document, for instance. In a 3.0 Co-creating CNO, 
by contrast, individual sections of the document, as well as proof-reading, overall look-and-feel and 
so forth would be distributed tasks broken down and assigned to individual contributors. 
In related presentations of this CNO table (see [5] and Table 3), Dutton extends the considerations 
associated with a given type to include the concepts of content ownership (Intellectual Property 
Rights – IPR) and evaluation (Performance: how do we know whether the CNO is successful or not?). 
For instance, in a 1.0 Sharing organisation, the Intellectual capital needs no protection per se: it is 
acknowledged and accepted as public and shared, by definition. In addition, if we wanted to assess 
how good or relevant that shared information might be, then for a 3.0 Collaborating (previously Co-
creating) environment, the number of appropriate individuals adding to the overall output – that is 
not just who is contributing, but are they the right contributor – is the main measure. 
 1.0 Sharing 2.0 Contributing 3.0 Collaborating 
Architecture One to many Many to many Many to one 
Openness and Control Open, Low Control Managing access Tiering, management control 
structures 
IPR Information shared Platform Co-created product 
Performance Viewers Quantity of Contributors Engaging targeted experts, 
producers 
Table 3: Issues of Control, Ownership and Evaluation with CNOs (from [5]) 
So what is the importance of this typology for WeGov? The implication of these tables is that once 
we have identified where WeGov sits in the typology, then architectural, management (openness 
and control), ownership and community evaluation (performance) types will all have been 
determined and can be appropriately addressed. Say, for instance, WeGov were seen as a 2.0 
Contributing project, then we could evaluate the architecture on the grounds that it needs to enable 
many individuals to contribute to many items; access would need to be managed (not everyone can 
join; and not everyone can contribute on everything); the content is “owned” by the platform itself, 
not by the individual contributors and not as part of an overall, aggregated output; and the number 
of people getting involved would be a measure of its success. 
This presents an interesting problem. The implication in related work
13
 (see [4 and 5]) is that 
organisations will tend to fit into one type or another, and this does inform the way they work and 
                                                          
13
 Dutton analyses a number of different types of CNO, ranging from the likes of Bugzilla to A Swarm of Angels. 
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should be set up. For WeGov, then it actually depends on the perspective taken. From a 
Government-as-beneficiary viewpoint, then this looks very much like a 3.0 Collaborating project. The 
hope is that many individuals will engage to provide their political opinions; there needs to be some 
management of the input to ensure that contributors are not exclusively activists with particular and 
extreme views; in essence the consensus that results is a “co-created product”; and its success or 
otherwise will be judged on the quality of the contributions – again, they would prefer informed 
opinion rather than bias and prejudice. This has various implications. For example, if the consensus is 
to be viewed as a “co-created product”, then it would be important to secure rights to the original 
individual opinions, or to request consent from those expressing those opinions. Similarly, it places 
an emphasis on some kind of aggregator – the result of many-to-one contributions – to marshal 
inputs into a suitable consensus, whilst maintaining the integrity of individual views. This would 
make WeGov a data processor, in data protection parlance, not a controller which in itself has 
important consequences for the handling and storage of the opinions collected. As such, WeGov 
enables the collection of data (public opinion), will effect some analysis (such as aggregation) and 
then passes those data on to the policy makers, who might store the data as well as review and 
develop ideas based on the opinions expressed. The policy makers, as operators of the WeGov 
services, act therefore as data controllers. 
An alternative view though would be to consider the citizens’ viewpoint. For a typical, open debate 
(i.e. posting messages on a social networking site, or SNS), then the 1.0 Sharing type seems much 
more appropriate. An individual will express a view and this will be made available to many: the 
architecture should be one-to-many, therefore – a message board or chatroom or similar. There is 
little control; from the outset, the opinions offered are shared and public; their value derives from 
how many other people view and comment on them
14
. Data protection is of little relevance here, 
beyond the need perhaps to dissociate particular individuals from particular opinions (protecting 
individual identity
15
 and not the view expressed) because by definition the SNS as a 1.0 Sharing type 
provides a forum for individuals to broadcast content to anyone and everyone else. Of course, the 
architecture and behavioural paradigm fit this type perfectly: Social Networking Sites. They are set 
up for individuals to express views and broadcast them to all (where “all” is optionally anyone who 
should access the site, or the trusted circle of cyber friends identified by the individual). There is 
little control, and moderation if any tends to be on an ad hoc, self-regulatory basis. The 
“performance” of any individual is very much judged on the basis of how many posts are received in 
relation to what they started, assuming there are no spammers or other such inappropriate 
behaviours . 
Since the type of CNO changes depending on the perspective (Government-as-beneficiary versus 
Citizens), it is tempting to conclude that CNOs may not be the right way to approach the project at 
all. Instead, something which categorises the project into one type or another seems preferable. But 
this, in fact, is not the case. The various typologies highlight the different expectations of those 
involved as the real actors: the citizens providing the inputs, and the Government (or policy makers) 
as beneficiaries of those inputs. The challenge for the WeGov project is not so much blanket 
conformance with all the regulation associated with data protection, but simply to match the 
requirements of a 3.0 Collaborating CNO with those of a 1.0 Sharing one. Effectively WeGov needs to 
                                                          
14
 Comments could be semantically parsed to categorise them into broad agree/disagree measures. 
15
 Here, SNS’s provide a useful precedent derived from traditional broadcasting: individuals may “anonymise” themselves either with 
completely random pseudonyms (Trekky, Golum etc) or more informative (35yoMumof2) 
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interconnect two systems supporting different CNOs considering approaches to architecture, 
openness/control, IPR and performance. As such, data protection is reduced solely to what is 
actually required to maximise collaborative interchange. Figure 3 summarises this for WeGov. 
Citizens trust the online community as a 1.0 Sharing environment and will therefore participate fully 
to offer opinions and views. The “end users” in the sense of government representatives, using the 
WeGov toolset in aggregating the data available on the SNS, operate as a 3.0 Co-creating network 
providing opinion to the policy-makers. There are two CNO’s in operation here, then. 
 
Figure 3: A different WeGov-centric view on data privacy 
What everyone wants from the online community using the SNS is their participation, which in turn 
requires trust. For WeGov there are at least two different sets of relationships that are relevant: on 
the one hand, the online community itself would hopefully continue to run as normal; it is a 1.0 
Sharing CNO. On the other, the Consortium, the SNS (indirectly) and the End users collaborate to 
generate the required output, namely public opinion. In this, they function as a 3.0 Co-creating or 
Collaborating CNO. Privacy as maintained through data protection is now not so much a question of 
implementing all appropriate security measures to ensure the protection and integrity of the data. 
Instead, it is a guarantee that individual identities will be shielded: there should be nothing to 
connect the opinion with the person or persons who expressed it. As stated above, WeGov as a 
project needs to be able to connect and map the two CNOs effectively to succeed, and in so doing 
should be guided by the trust requirements of the online communities to ensure and maintain their 
participation. 
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The technical issues can be summarised in terms of what is required to allow maximum input
16
. 
There are few economic issues in the financial sense, unless there is to be some licensing of data or 
modest payment to users; or in the sense of increased burden or contention for resource, given that 
there is no particular requirement to increase activity beyond current levels. Socially, the focus is on 
self-regulation (the number and types of comments and response-chains) and the potential - when 
married with the 3.0 Collaborating type required to process the opinions for policy-makers – 
removal of specifics which identify any individual
17
. The regulatory or legislative considerations are 
far more focused and confined than might previously have been thought. 
 1.0 Sharing 
The Citizens’ Input 
3.0 Collaborating 
Government use of that input 
Technical Requires a one-to-many platform, allowing 
open, relaxed interaction and the free and 
open sharing of ideas and comments in 
response to those ideas. 
Requires many-to-one aggregation of inputs, 
with some filtering and “control” associated 
with who can and cannot participate. The 
output is a co-created consensus of opinions. 
Social Participants are used to offering views and 
comments freely and without restraint in an 
SNS environment. There are inherent 
cybertrust boundaries that can be exploited 
in SNS’s, which have been developed by users 
to manage and regulate their own and other 
inputs. 
The issue is one of respect for individual views 
and the protection of those expressing those 
views (their identity). 
Management Very little required. Most inputs will be self-
regulated. 
Some control of who can participate. Perhaps 
some different levels of participant or 
participant type could be tried. 
Table 4: CNOs and WeGov 
In summary, the CNO type depends on the viewpoint. Input from individual users and subscribers to 
SNS’s is very much a 1.0 Sharing environment, where opinion is freely offered within the context of 
known social interactions. How those views are processed for the policy makers is more a 3.0 
Collaborating organisation: data are aggregated and processed to extract common themes and 
responses. Table 4 brings this together. In reviewing the typologies implied by the general public on 
the one hand and the government/policy makers on the other informs the decisions which really are 
important for the WeGov project. 
Support Outcome Comments 
Constructing issues and research 
challenges 
The Social Analysis (an abstraction of Dutton’s CNO concept) approach has 
highlighted that WeGov is really about marrying expectations and requirements 
from two different well-established types. This could lead on to the identification 
and pursuit of a range of different challenges related to the mapping of expectations 
and practices from one area to the other. Identifying and addressing any issues 
which arise from the coexistence and potential interdependence of these two types 
is no longer really about data protection legislation. 
                                                          
16
 Note that there is no discussion here of filtering input on qualitative lines; the value of any opinions or comments will tend to be self-
regulating in that participants will decide for themselves what constitutes good and poor inputs. 
17
 Anonymisation – removing anything which might associated data with its source – is not a trivial operation, and may not be completely 
successful. For one thing, to anonymise data, the original personal details and data need to be processed which means that strict data 
protection is still required at some stage in the proceedings. 
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Support Outcome Comments 
Facilitation of communication and 
debate 
Typing the contexts in which the main groups – the public at one end and the 
Government at the other – helps to identify and describe what is and is not 
important to each group. Should problems or concerns arise, then this provides a 
context in which questions can be raised and worked on jointly. 
Assessment of technology 
advances 
Not at this stage: the technologies at either end are well understood (and currently 
available). The main issue is mapping the two environments. The success of that 
mapping could indeed provide some way to assess technology innovation. 
Improving engineering design 
through insights from other 
domains 
By definition, viewing the “trust” of participants in a CNO from a social rather than 
technology point of view has led to a different assessment of the design issues. 
Designing legally compliant Future 
Internet experiments 
The approach has highlighted what really matters to users in terms of trust and data 
protection. This helps to refocus regulatory concerns – users of the WeGov services 
operate at most as a data processor rather than controller; identity protection is 
more important to the user, but can be handed off to the user
15
 rather than pose 
technical challenges. 
Improving project design and 
decision making 
Typing the essentials from the viewpoint of users and beneficiaries has provided a 
different, and hopefully more informative, perspective which would benefit issue 
identification and resolution. 
Table 5: How useful is Social Analysis? 
4.3 Tussles: Design the playing field and not the outcome 
Prompted by an “important reality that surrounds the Internet”, tussles first began to be formalised 
and discussed in 2002 [3
18
]:  as the result of a DARPA-funded research project: 
“different stakeholders that are part of the Internet milieu have interests that may be adverse to 
each other, and these parties each vie to favour their particular interests” [op.cit. Abstract] 
The paper discusses many aspects of contention within network architecture and operation. But the 
basic tenets are these: 
• Engineers design for predictable outcomes; 
• The Internet grew up on that basis – ie., an engineering construct for high and reliable 
performance; 
• The Internet has now changed into a more social animal, as a result of the users who have 
claimed it for their own; and so 
• The engineers designing for it now need to design with contention in mind. 
Much of the limited derivative work
19
 has been focussed on network-centric issues of protocol 
enhancement and business models affecting ISPs and the ASPs that depend on them, though some 
have picked up on the original “social animal” allusions in the original paper. On the network-centric, 
non-user side, Sollins [11], for instance, suggests that a tussle approach can help identify and resolve 
                                                          
18
 The 2005 IEEE version of the SIGCOMM’02 paper has only minor updates. 
19
 Google claims that there have been 381 citations of the 2002 version. 
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issues relating to network management, though this is an assertion which is not fully developed or 
explained. Similarly, Koponen et al [8] cite the tussle approach as helpful, but then do not specifically 
apply it to their main focus: the problem of DNS servers. In contrast to these purely technology-
based discussions, Bestavros [1] spends about equal time on technical issues such as domain name 
servers, routing and net architecture, as well as real usage, in terms of individual privacy, copyright 
infringement and Big Brother type activity tracing. His overriding message though is that it is time for 
coders to embrace the new reality of the Internet as a social instrument and to design for variation 
in outcome as opposed to a single predictable result. Brown [2] by contrast explores the relationship 
between regulation – what the law makers attempt to define and protect – and what can and should 
be done to protect the reality of civil liberties such as freedom of speech and privacy. For Brown, 
“tussles” are not only or even principally about the economics of Internet operation; he is much 
more interested in how the Internet can respond to its implicit responsibilities to those who use it in 
good faith. Clark too introduces a social dimension for trust in network usage: someone who 
receives a call may choose not to accept it. Tussles seem to be a promising suggestion, therefore, to 
begin to come to grips with issues of contention for the architecture and economic management of 
networks, but as yet there is little evidence that they offer any more than a taxonomy for contention 
definition. What is more significant, though, if the Internet really has become more a social 
instrument than just a technically intriguing challenge, we might begin to wonder whether a tussle 
methodology focuses on the trees rather than the proverbial wood. 
In trying to explore the usefulness of the tussle approach, Kalogiros et al [7] attempt to codify the 
methodology and define the types of contentions (“tussle patterns”) that may be expected. They 
suggest the following process to analyse any given tussle: 
1. Identify stakeholders; 
2. Identify tussles among stakeholders and their relationship; and then 
3. For each tussle: 
a. Identify how control is distributed between stakeholders; 
b. Assess impact where control is not in balance; 
c. Identify whether a subset of disadvantaged stakeholders could gain more control by 
whatever means. 
Further, they identify a number of tussle categories or patterns: 
Tussle Pattern Description  Possible Resolution Example 
Contention 
Two or more parties 
(consumers, or consumers 
and suppliers) wish to exploit 
the same resource. 
Through restoration of economic 
equilibrium or external 
regulation. 
Use of cloud resources, 
resulting in bandwidth 
contention (even malicious 
bandwich). 
Repurposing 
A resource is used for a 
purpose not originally 
envisaged (or paid for). 
Restrict access to  / capabilities of 
the resource(s). 
Sharing copyrighted 
materials; selling on personal 
information. 
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Responsibility 
Resources are used for 
purposes not acceptable to 
original provider. 
Difficult to resolve because some 
agent has to defend rights of 
non-associated 3
rd
 party. 
Distributing content 
protected by rights. 
Control 
Multiple resources (or 
actions) determine the 
outcome. 
Restrict usage of other resources 
to force dependence on 
individual supplier. 
An ISP trying to restrict 
consumer to their own VoIP 
offering, rather than 
accessing any other 
offerings. 
Table 6: Tussle patterns from [7] 
The tussle patterns may be of use in trying to categorise and thereby characterise general 
contention types, that may be of relevance to other projects as well. There is a concern, though: the 
description of the issues here is very much on the basis of the economics of resource exploitation. 
We need to restate the description with more of a focus on the services and activities run on those 
resources, rather than the resources themselves. The intention here is to generalise the patterns to 
be more applicable to social interactions enabled by the Future Internet, and not just the economics 
of developing or running such an infrastructure. The table below is a first attempt to broaden the 
patterns out to include applications or interactions, whilst maintaining the same classificatory 
intentions. 
Tussle Pattern Description Resolution Example 
Contention 
Two or more parties have 
conflicting interests around 
the same issue. 
Through negotiation, consensus, 
compromise, or withdrawal. 
Agreeing the price of a 
contract; negotiating terms; 
and so forth. 
Repurposing 
A party uses something for a 
purpose not originally 
intended. 
Litigation or economic sanction. Asking people to respond to 
a survey, but using 
responses for targeted 
marketing. 
Responsibility 
A party knows something is 
being done, which is 
inappropriate, but is not 
motivated to do anything 
about it. 
Whistle blowing. An ISP is aware that a 
Government is monitoring 
web use for surveillance 
purposes. 
Control 
Multiple claims on the same 
data/resource. 
Enforcement of terms and 
conditions or other usage 
constraints. 
Collecting one set of data for 
multiple purposes. 
Table 7: Tussle patterns - a more generic approach? 
This discussion provides a useful framework against which to analyse any given contention. In fact, 
they apply their methodology to a number of existing projects, if nothing else to establish the tussle 
pattern associated with a given issue in a given project
20
. We now return to WeGov and provide two 
example tussles from the project.  
Government vs Consortium, End-Users, Commission: Control Tussle Pattern
21
 
                                                          
20
 They reviewed Trilogy, ETICS, SmoothIT, MOBITHIN and SENDORA. 
21
 In this section, we consider WeGov solely from the perspective of what the project is doing internally, and not with the broader issue of 
how the results and data of the project may be used outside the project. 
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The Government is the legislature that generates any and all regulation. It is up to the Consortium, 
the end-users and the Commission to respect and comply with it. For the Consortium, the legislation 
may limit their ability to explore all of the potential from the data made available to them. Further, it 
imposes obvious requirements on what they produce in terms of tools and services, all of which 
must conform to the same legislation. The end-users are bound, of course, by the working practices 
and requirements of their employers (the Government), but more importantly cannot be seen to 
deviate from the law: even when operating within the law, surveillance for instance could be very 
damaging to their reputation. They are ultimately dependent on the Consortium to provide them 
with some level of protection against inappropriate use of the data (see above), even if such 
protection may have to be in the form of advice and guidance. Finally, the Commission has to ensure 
that no project contravenes any legislation, as well as complying itself. There is a burden of 
enforcement on them to some extent, but more importantly, they may well be more open to 
reasonable compromise in the case of WeGov since it is in their best interests as well as of the 
Consortium to work together to ensure complete compliance to data protection laws, whilst 
extracting the maximum benefit from the data on offer. 
We describe this as a “control” pattern, since Government regulation will ultimately bound whatever 
use is made of the data in WeGov, even though different parties may wish to use the data in 
different ways. 
• Control: anything involving regulation will tend to be weighted in favour of one of the 
stakeholders: the balance for this tussle is firmly tipped in favour of the legislature.  This 
fails, however, to see the Government in a different stakeholder guise: they want to get the 
data from the general public on policy proposals and so forth, cynically to give the 
impression of encouraging participation, but equally perhaps in a genuine attempt to ensure 
that everyone is heard. In this case, control is more evenly distributed. It is the general public 
who can exert the greatest influence, mainly through non-participation. With the 
Government as this kind of participant, then the tussle is balanced. 
• Impact: failure to comply with legislation generally involves punitive sanctions - financial 
(fines) as the result of legal proceedings. In the case of the unbalanced, regulatory tussle 
described first above, the Government has the power to disable any of the other 
stakeholders. This could have far-reaching consequences not confined to the present 
project. 
• Disadvantaged stakeholder moves: there is little scope for the Commission, the Consortium 
or the end-users to try to redress the balance. However, there is always the potential to 
push back and try to effect a change in legislation: if regulation prevents any usable data 
becoming available, there is certainly an incentive for the Government to show some 
flexibility. This is viable only when the Government has both of the two different stakeholder 
types mentioned previously: although the ultimate regulatory authority, they are also a 
significant beneficiary if the project succeeds. 
This tussle illustrates the phenomenon that stakeholders may have different interests, depending on 
the view taken of the specific tussle. On the one hand, the Government hold all the cards. They are 
responsible for the legislation, and expect and require compliance. On the other, they are a 
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beneficiary of the work to be performed and therefore have some motivation to see regulation 
changed to allow them to get the most out of what is on offer. Designing for this tussle would be 
difficult, therefore, since the same player becomes involved at different times in the same tussle 
with different vested interests. It may be that designing network infrastructure is a rather simpler 
task than handling contract negotiation. We conclude that contention between government and 
Consortium, End-users and commission, does not fit easily within the tussle paradigm. 
Consortium vs Cloud suppliers: Responsibility Tussle Pattern 
The Consortium had initially proposed using Cloud facilities to process incoming data from users (the 
citizens). Political opinion falls into the category of personal data requiring protection and specific 
security measures when processing. Cloud providers do not, however, typically meet these security 
criteria. The Consortium may not, therefore, recommend those facilities to be used to process 
personal data. 
This tussle relates directly to economic considerations. Cloud providers do not currently provide the 
security features required when handling personal data. To implement them would require 
investment, increased operating costs and potentially constraints of operational practices (i.e. 
restrictions on policies for virtualisation). Without a sufficient business case, there is no incentive for 
the Cloud suppliers to make such a change to their facilities. Government regulation is not a 
significant enough argument: they support and make a business out of other resource-intensive 
activities which do not require such measures. It is theoretically possible that the Consortium might 
fund some of the work needed, though this is highly unlikely and would be difficult to justify. Why 
would public funding be used to bring a supplier into regulatory compliance?  
As such, there is an impasse. To exploit Cloud facilities as the Consortium describe in their original 
proposal to the Commission may result in significant increases in operating costs due to the extra 
burden of ensuring adequate data protection compliance. Regulation provides safeguards; it is not 
typically used to impose business strategy. Since this is about who should take ownership for what, 
this is a “responsibility” tussle. 
• Control: the tussle is weighted in favour of the Cloud suppliers, in that there is little the 
Consortium can do other than offer to fund or financially support the investment needed. 
• Impact: the Consortium finds it difficult to fulfil the statement of work within the secured 
funding from the Commission. To avoid project cancellation or other sanctions, the 
Consortium may need to negotiate a modification to the statement of work, for example, 
hosting cloud services within the consortium or outsourcing work to a data protection 
compliant hosting provider. 
• Disadvantaged stakeholder moves: there is little the Consortium can do as far as the Cloud 
suppliers are concerned, since financial support is not a feasible option. Were they to 
attempt to put forward a business case to make the necessary investment by the Cloud 
suppliers attractive, they would still be delayed in what they could deliver and when. 
This additional aspect of the issues surrounding data protection for the WeGov project most closely 
approximates the classic tussles described elsewhere ([3, 7, 8 and 11]). It is very closely linked to the 
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economics of providing network capabilities to support a given function or set of functions. 
“Designing for the playing field” of data protection [1] would have required Cloud providers to 
support the rapid integration of suitable data processing extensions, such as encryption and access 
control as well as the management of monitoring or other mid-path stations within the network 
itself that might divert or interrogate the data inappropriately. 
For both examples above – the Control tussle between Government on the one hand and the 
Consortium, End-Users and the Commission on the other; and the Responsibility tussle between the 
Consortium and Cloud suppliers – it would be possible to repeat the analysis specifically around the 
issue of research drivers, regulatory compliance and the reality of participation in SNS. This may lead 
to the identification of yet more options for the disadvantaged stakeholders to attempt to regain 
some level of balance through the creative use of technology (solutions based on encryption, for 
instance) as well as architectural implementation (including distributed processing to make it more 
difficult for a third party to access all but a small proportion of the overall dataset). For now, though 
we will confine ourselves to the two illustrations here which suggest two extremes: in the first case, 
a less-than satisfactory set of conclusions in respect of stakeholders, and in the second, a rather 
more “classic” tussle problem. 
Supporting Outcome Comments 
Constructing issues and 
research challenges 
Focusing on stakeholders and the relationships between them helps to begin to look at 
potential problems and issues. At that stage, there is much scope for investigative work 
and research. Specifically for WeGov, tussle analysis has revealed more about 
relationships and dialogues to be had between different direct and indirect 
stakeholders rather than actual research or development topics. 
Facilitation of communication 
and debate 
There is some indication that tussles have helped establish what the issues are and who 
needs to be approached. 
Assessment of technology 
advances 
New security mechanisms. 
Improving engineering design 
through insights from other 
domains 
N/A 
Designing legally compliant 
Future Internet experiments 
The tussles have indicated what should be considered in respect of legal compliance. It 
is difficult, however, to establish whether this was not obvious in advance.  
Improving project design and 
decision making 
To some degree. The tussles outlined have tended to show what needs to be taken into 
consideration and who needs to be approached for discussion and negotiation.  
Table 8: How useful are Tussles? 
4.4 Risk management: Design for outcome considering uncertainty 
The most obvious approach to achieve legal compliance is to adopt a risk management approach. 
With its roots in safety and security disciplines, risk management has been applied to many different 
areas and scenarios, from biohazards [9] to standard business planning [13], and has even been 
standardised [10]. ISO/IEC 27001 stipulates that a risk analysis method should be used, but the 
method is not a part of the standard, and no specific method is proposed, apart from integrating the 
PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, Act) recursive process of the model as defined for the creation of the ISMS 
(Information Security Management System).  ISO 27005 [15] was recently published (04 June 2008) 
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to provide guidelines for information security risk management and to support the general concepts 
specified in ISO/IEC 27001. However, implementers are left to devise their own methods consistent 
with these guidelines. EBIOS [16], MEHARI [17] and OCTAVE [18] are all examples of risk 
management methods. 
In general, risk management is an on-going process designed to assess the likelihood of an adverse 
event occurring, implementing measures to reduce the risk that such an event will occur and ensure 
the organisation can respond in such a way as to minimise the consequences of the event:  
“Risk may be defined […] as the probability of occurrence of an adverse outcome and the 
severity of the consequences if the outcome does occur” [It] must be directed towards assisting 
those responsible for making decisions to do so in a way which is consistent with scientific 
principles, legal requirements and public values” [9]. 
Unlike tussles, where the by-word is design for variable outcomes, risk analysis focuses on a specific 
objective. In the WeGov project this is data protection compliance for Future Internet research 
experiments that aim to collect and process personal data from online communities for 
identification and tracking of political opinion. To address this objective the project adopted a risk 
management approach building on deep technical and legal expertise [20]. 
As preparation for risk management a legal analysis was performed by the WeGov project use cases 
in relation to the principal EC Directive regulating the processing of personal data: Directive 
95/46/EC9. The main challenge is to understand the implications of information processing that 
crosses different legislative (US to Europe) and administrative (facebook® to Policy Maker) domains. 
The legal analysis starts by identifying the processes of each use case including monitoring on SNS, 
consent and fair processing information notice on SNS, extraction, and topic injection. For each 
process an examination is made on how privacy and use policies of specific SNS (e.g. facebook® and 
Twitter®) relate to legislative roles and obligations. In some cases recommendations are made for 
compliance such as limiting the scope of the WeGov toolset’s search to only those comments of 
users that have joined an official facebook® Page or a group set up by the Policy Maker, thereby 
obtaining explicit consent (via opt in) from the site user. The project then uses the OCTAVE Allegro 
risk management method to identify risks and security requirements that need to be implemented 
by the project for compliance. The outcome of the analysis is a risk measurement criterion in 
relation to impact areas for Policy Makers, profiles of critical information assets, threats to those 
assets and security requirements that should be implemented to mitigate the threats.  
Some risk management approaches [10] encourage the consideration of opportunities as well as 
threats in all stages after risk identification. This is not included by OCTAVE and therefore was not 
considered by WeGov. Without going into specific detail on all of the risks identified, it is clear just 
how pervasive the data protection issue is for the project. At one level it affects Research and 
development, Intellectual capital, Reputation and Data loss, the main concern associated with data 
protection, but also Citizen demotivation and in consequence Public opinion; Consortium 
collaboration and deliverable schedule: internal issues which could be affected by any actions taken 
in response to data protection concerns within Clouds. For each of these areas, it would be possible 
to consider the threats and opportunities that result. 
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The opportunities and threats shown in Table 9 provide yet another perspective on the issues facing 
the WeGov project. Looking at threats – and again this is not a quantitative analysis – these help to 
prioritise the issues and concerns. Without such prioritisation, time and effort may be wasted on 
matters of little overall importance and beyond the direct control of the consortium. (Note, 
however, that there is no explicit division here into internal and external risks.) On the other hand, 
the opportunities shift the focus from the problem into the solution. This encourages problems to be 
viewed in a more positive light and as part and parcel of any project. 
Risk Opportunity Threat 
Research and development Develop new techniques to analyse 
personal data which protects the rights of 
the individual providing those data. 
 
Explore what can and cannot be done 
with anonymised data. This may result in 
a pragmatic decision that this is 
impractical, which in itself would be of 
value beyond the project to others in 
similar situations. 
Work could be sanctioned (halted; no 
funding) without tangible and innovative 
returns. 
Intellectual capital Without a creative approach to the 
issues, nothing will be generated. 
Reputation Demonstrate that valuable work can be 
achieved even under regulatory 
constraint. 
 
Explore and question regulation. 
Dependent on compliance, but also 
project execution. Reputation loss is a 
significant problem for government and 
government representatives alike. 
Data loss and leaks Introduce appropriate measures and 
procedures to protect data. 
 
Embed expiration handling. 
Public outrage. Lack of participation. 
Project funding risk or other sanction. 
Citizen demotivation Engage directly and frequently with public 
to encourage involvement and see the 
benefits of the work. Enable feedback 
from policy makers to maintain 
participation and debate. 
No data to analyse. 
Public opinion Constraint on future funding. 
Consortium collaboration Discuss alternatives internally and with 
project office involvement.  
 
Refocus work. 
Failure to deliver project content or on 
time. 
Deliverable schedule 
Regulation Explore potential for regulatory change. 
Exploit Government as beneficiary of 
project to present a case for change. 
Constrains any innovative work. 
Table 9: Generalised opportunities and threats resulting from risk management 
Throughout the process there is an emphasis on communication: let all stakeholders know what is 
going on. Although the methods do not specifically attempt to provide guidance on how to identify 
those stakeholders, it is an essential step to keep decision-makers informed about the findings and 
recommendations of the experts engaged in the risk assessment. In applying risk analysis to WeGov, 
we are not confined to economic or regulatory concerns amongst those with a vested interest (the 
stakeholders or decision-makers) in the work. Instead, we can review and prioritise what the real 
concerns are and are encouraged to look for solutions before we even begin, and whether or not 
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those risks should become a reality. What is more, in exploring both the threats (the negative 
outcomes) and the opportunities posed by the risks we have identified, we are able to present a 
clearer and more balanced picture and action plan to all stakeholders and the public. This 
communication is a significant and essential part of the process. Where trust and participation are 
concerned, communication is also a must. So risk analysis looks for solutions to problems, and not 
just their characteristics, emphasises open communication with all concerned, and is not constrained 
to any particular domain. It therefore has a broader and more generic applicability than tussle 
analysis. 
Support Outcome Comments 
Constructing issues and 
research challenges 
Around specific objectives, risk analysis can highlight the potential solutions (mitigation 
strategies) to address problems. Such solutions represent key focus areas for research 
and targeted development. There is a problem, though, that the objective of the risk 
analysis is generally confined to a specific issue. As such, unless the technique is tried 
many times on different areas of risk, items will potentially be missed. 
Facilitation of communication 
and debate 
Risk analysis includes communication and feedback between all parties. Since the 
process involves some thought and discussion around potential solutions or at least 
mitigation (areas which can direct effort and research), then it provides a complete 
overview to help articulate problem and possible solution.  
Assessment of technology 
advances 
Technology improvements or enhancements can be identified and evaluated readily: 
these will occur as implementations of the potential solutions identified previously. 
However, once again, unless all aspects of the project are reviewed, some technology 
advancement drivers may be lost and thereby their potential solution. 
Improving engineering design 
through insights from other 
domains 
There is no specific involvement of external expertise. However, discussion around 
potential solutions can help identify where expertise is required. 
Designing legally compliant 
Future Internet experiments 
If the objective involves risks associated with non-compliance, then yes. Otherwise, no. 
This goes back to the objective setting up-front. 
Improving project design and 
decision making 
The whole essence of the technique is to highlight issues at design time for the decision-
makers to make better, and more informed decisions. 
Table 10: How useful is Risk Analysis? 
Risk analysis does provide some support for the key questions proposed by SESERV. The main 
emphasis is on highlighting issues, exploring potential solutions, and articulating these to all those 
with a vested interest, including the decision-makers. It does need to be run iteratively: the 
technique focuses on a specific objective each time. Additionally, and in contrast to tussle analysis, it 
is directed towards the (potential) resolution of issues: it is design for a fixed, not a variable 
outcome. Its strength lies in solution exploration up-front, as well as communication across all 
involved. 
5 Conclusions 
The goal to increase participation in political discourse through the use of popular social networking 
sites has many attractions. Likewise, the goal to comply with data protection legislation is also 
equally valid and as well as necessary. The social analysis shows that a critical success factor (i.e. 
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participation) for social networking providers is to maximise activity, which is achieved irrespective 
of the purpose of the communication between individuals. The risk assessment highlights that for 
legal compliance providers must take responsibilities (in respect to purpose) and individuals need to 
take certain actions (e.g. consent). So here lies the contradiction. Privacy compliance, often declared 
as a way to increase trust, and hence participation, in effect impedes activity and actually acts as an 
inhibiter to participation. In reality, individuals use social networking sites because their perception 
of risk is considered low enough for participation. It is the perception of and appetite for risk that 
that dictate levels of participation, irrespective of associated regulation. 
This leads to an interesting challenge for European service providers and research projects such as 
WeGov. How to balance strike the balance between participation and privacy considering desires to 
monitor and mine data without violating a citizen’s right to privacy? Architectures that facilitate 
communication between individuals regardless of purpose have been important innovators in the 
Internet. It is a principle that has contributed to the explosion of Internet use (the end-point 
principle) and it is improbable that the successful paradigms of the last decade, social networking 
and clouds, would not have prospered if they had considered compliance to the European regulatory 
environment. Each new paradigm has focused on promoting the benefits of solutions and opted for 
weak privacy positions. The try it and observe approach has allowed for a privacy balance to evolve 
over time as participants explored their preferences rather than having them analysed in advance by 
security experts. Social networking has been in fact a large experiment in people’s appetite for 
privacy. 
This paper has considered the challenges faced by an ICT STREP, the WeGov project, in this context 
considering social, economic and regulatory aspects. We looked at a number of analytical 
techniques, each of which provides a different perspective on the issues that the project needs to 
address. Figure 4 summarises the analyses in the sections above and should be viewed in connection 
with Figure 2. Initially, there seemed to be many and varied challenges, some of which might clearly 
fit within a given domain and some of which seemed to straddle the boundaries between them. Our 
initial SWOT analysis of WeGov homed in on two major concerns: participation and trust. Essentially, 
how can ordinary citizens be encouraged to take part, whilst at the same time ensuring that they are 
comfortable with how their input will be used?  
With the outcome of the SWOT analysis in mind, the following sections looked at three different 
perspectives: 
1. A social analytical approach, based on collaborative network organisations; 
2. Tussle analysis, proposed in connection with network contention; and 
3. Risk analysis, which generally looks at the risk (and opportunities) associated with a specific 
objective. 
Each of these approaches revealed and highlighted different issues and challenges. The reworked 
figure (Figure 4) shows the focus and benefits of a given approach. 
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Figure 4: Different perspectives bring varied benefits 
The tussle approach concentrates attention for WeGov on the contention between the Consortium, 
wanting to exploit resources, and Cloud providers as well as SNS providers. These are clear economic 
and resource issues. In other cases, a tussle analysis brought little benefit to the discussion of project 
challenges. Contention between Government or policy-makers and any of the other stakeholders 
gained nothing from the approach. In contrast, risk analysis, when focused on the specific issue of 
data privacy, highlighted much of what would be needed to guarantee compliance to the 
appropriate legislation. It deals well with regulatory aspects of projects, and helps highlight what 
might happen and how to mitigate the risk. There was little insight, however, provided for what data 
protection and trust might mean for those taking part, the general public. Collaborative network 
organisations (CNO) – the social approach – revealed two significant factors, among many. First: 
participants in social networks will have their own notions of trust and privacy; as part of a 1.0 
Sharing CNO there is an expectation that views and opinions are shared one to many and in the 
public domain. Secondly, that the consortium, SNS and end-users (government employees) all have 
some contribution to make to creating the processed content needed by policy-makers. They 
operate within a 3.0 Collaborating CNO, and are subject to different constraints and expectations in 
terms of the infrastructure required and the implications for the ownership and protection of 
content. This social analysis focuses on participation, on the one hand between members of the 
general public (subscribers to the SNS) and on the other between the technologists upon which the 
WeGov deliverables depend. Participatory models are important; regulation and economics have 
only indirect and secondary significance. 
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We summarise the approaches attempted above in Table 11. The particular domain of interest 
(social, economic or regulatory) would seem to dictate the approach to be used. Identifying the most 
important domain though, in terms of what a project is really about, may not be that easy. The 
Internet began as a technical challenge to allow technical users (academics) to distribute and share 
documentation. Routing, data integrity and bandwidth are all important. The Internet has now 
developed to be a vehicle for social interaction. The focus now, surely, is on its social exploitation 
than its technical infrastructure. 
 
Methodology General Approach Domain Comments 
SWOT Analysis Analysis of all factors (positive 
and negative) which might 
influence a project or activity. 
Usually 
commercially 
focused. 
Provides a rapid means to home in 
on the major issues: participation 
and trust. Balance between negative 
and positive factors is important. 
Social analysis Focus on motivation and issues 
associated with different modes 
of interaction. 
Social, 
application layer 
Focus is on the real stakeholders 
(citizens and government-as-
beneficiary) and underlines their 
respective expectations and 
requirements. As such the problems 
and issues are set in a different 
context which refocuses discussion 
and design into a far more familiar 
and tractable space. 
Tussle analysis Consider areas of contention; 
look for stakeholders and analyse 
the relationship(s) between 
them. 
Economic, 
technical  
Largely a framework to identify that a 
problem exists; little scope for 
contention resolution, or the 
inclusion of factors other than 
economic/technical. 
Risk analysis Identify risks or issues; examine 
mitigation possibilities; 
encourage participation and 
consensus. 
Domain 
agnostic; useful 
for 
consideration of 
regulatory 
constraints. 
Focus is on problem identification up-
front, risk mitigation and 
participation, at least at the level of 
knowledge sharing. 
Table 11: Overview of analytical techniques to assess the issues for WeGov 
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